Recognition, Redistribution, and Liberty

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Outline

1. Introduction
   - Motivation
   - Existing Literature

2. Theory
   - A Bunch of Definitions
   - Propositions, Claims, Other Yadda Yadda

3. Case Studies
   - A Series of Unfortunate Events

4. Conclusion
   - Summary
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Case Studies
A Series of Unfortunate Events

Conclusion
Summary
Redistribution and Recognition

- Preoccupation of two schools of political theory and philosophy
  - Social justice (Dworkin 1986; Nozick 1974; Rawls 1999) and the politics of class
  - Mutual recognition (Hegel 1807; Kojève 1980) and the politics of identity

- Relationship between redistribution and recognition remains poorly understood
  - Theoretical value: Distinguish *ex ante* observation from *ex post* ideal
  - Practical relevance: Interest-versus-identity-based social movements
Preoccupation of two schools of political theory and philosophy
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Recognition, Redistribution, and Liberty

Introduction
Motivation

Recognition, Redistribution, and Liberty

- Linkages between redistribution and recognition
  - Fraser (1995, 2003): “Conception of justice that encompasses both... without reducing either type to the other”
  - Honneth (1996, 2003): “Normative monism of recognition... that seeks to subsume the problematic of redistribution”
  - Reject “economistic view that would reduce recognition to a mere epiphenomenon of distribution”
- Inject notion of (Hayekian) individual liberty
  - Operationalize with notion of minimal liberalism
  - Liberty allows decoupling of link between redistribution and recognition
Linkages between redistribution and recognition

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Inject notion of (Hayekian) individual liberty

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- Liberty allows decoupling of link between redistribution and recognition
Why Can’t Philosophers Get Along?

- Critical theory in tradition of the Frankfurt School

1 Status model (Fraser 1995, 2000, 2003; Tully 2000; Young 2002)
  - Two-dimensional conception of justice with recognition and redistribution
  - No redistribution without recognition and vice versa

2 Monism model (Honneth 1996, 2003; Yar 2001)
  - Mutual recognition in intimacy ♡, equality =, and achievement ♣
  - Redistribution is subordinate to recognition and subsumed by it
Why Can’t Philosophers Get Along?

- Critical theory in tradition of the Frankfurt School

   - Two-dimensional conception of justice with recognition and redistribution
   - No redistribution without recognition and *vice versa*

   - Mutual recognition in intimacy ♡, equality =, and achievement ♣
   - Redistribution is subordinate to recognition and subsumed by it
What I Claim I’ll Do

- Dispute claim that rational decisionmaking reduces recognition to secondary outcome
- Contribute to understanding of redistribution, recognition, and liberty
- Clarify relationships using social-choice and game-theoretic approach
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Recognition of the (Hegelian) Other

Definition (Recognition)
Let the recognition of a specific group $j$ by another $i$ be a purposive event represented by $\rho_{ij} = \rho_{ji} \neq \emptyset$. Then, a group $j$ is said to be recognized by $i$ (and vice versa) when $j \in \rho^i \subset \mathbb{R}$, where $\mathbb{R}$ is the set of all possible recognitions for groups in society.
Recognition of the (Hegelian) Other

**Definition (Recognition)**

Let the recognition of a specific group $j$ by another $i$ be a purposive event represented by $\rho_{ij} = \rho_{ji} \neq \emptyset$. Then, a group $j$ is said to be *recognized* by $i$ (and *vice versa*) when $j \in \rho^i \subset \mathcal{R}$, where $\mathcal{R}$ is the set of all possible recognitions for groups in society.
Example: The Dry Salvages

We appreciate this better
In the agony of others, nearly experienced,
Involving ourselves, than in our own.
For our own past is covered by the currents of action,
But the torment of others remains an experience
Unqualified, unworn by subsequent attrition.
Redistribution according to diachronic or subjunctive baselines

Definition (Redistribution)

Let a real transfer from a specific group $i$ to another $j$ be an action represented by $\tau_{ij} > 0$. Then, a group $j$ is said to be the recipient of a redistribution from $i$ when $j \in \tau^i \subset \mathcal{T}$, where $\mathcal{T}$ is the set of all possible redistributive schemes in the universe of this society.
Redistribution

- Redistribution according to diachronic or subjunctive baselines

**Definition (Redistribution)**

Let a real transfer from a specific group $i$ to another $j$ be an action represented by $\tau_{ij} > 0$. Then, a group $j$ is said to be the recipient of a *redistribution* from $i$ when $j \in \tau^i \subset \mathcal{T}$, where $\mathcal{T}$ is the set of all possible redistributive schemes in the universe of this society.
Recognition

Example: The Poor and Downtrodden

“Hey, boy! How ya doin’? . . . Look at him, Dan. Poor guy’s been floating out here for days, but he’s still just as fat and happy as ever.”
Liberty

- **Minimal form of individual liberty**

**Definition (Minimal liberalism)**

*Minimal liberalism* is said to hold when, in a society with at least two individuals, there is at least one pair of alternatives over which an individual $i$ is decisive. That is, for any pair of alternatives $\{\tau', \tau''\}$ or $\{\rho', \rho''\}$, if $\tau' \succ_i \tau''$, then $\tau' \succ \tau''$ (and, respectively, if $\rho' \succ_i \rho''$, then $\rho' \succ \rho''$), where $\succ_i$ and $\succ$ are preference relations for the individual and society, respectively. A society $\sigma$ that exhibits this property exists in the set $\mathcal{L}$. 
Liberty

- Minimal form of individual liberty

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A Bunch of Definitions

Liberty II

Example: Sen’s Milwaukee’s Best
Minimal Liberty Allows Recognition and Redistribution

Proposition

*Minimal individual liberty is required for recognition.*

- Recognition can be construed independent of socialist ideal that links the two
- Minimal liberty as prerequisite for recognition
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Proof
Recall, Redistribution, and Liberty

Theory

Propositions, Claims, Other Yadda Yadda

Recognition Necessary but not Sufficient for Redistribution

**Proposition**

*Given (minimal) individual liberty, recognition of a group is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for redistribution to that group.*

- Condition is necessary, not sufficient
- Minimal liberty is fairly weak condition
- Intellectually analogous to Sen’s impossible Paretian liberal
Proposition

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Redistribution Indeterminate in Liberal Society

Corollary

In a liberal society, recognition is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for redistribution.

- Although positive statement, has normative implications

Corollary

A society that seeks to respect minimal liberalism can choose whether or not to redistribute to groups that it recognizes. In other words, the question of redistribution is indeterminate in a liberal society.
Redistribution Rule

- Mechanical rule effecting transfer if income falls below average

**Definition (Redistribution rule)**

Let $\tau^* \in \mathcal{T}$ be a rule where $y_i < \bar{y} \Rightarrow \tau_{ji,t} > 0$, where $\bar{y}$ is average income.
Redistribution Rule

- Mechanical rule effecting transfer if income falls below average

**Definition (Redistribution rule)**

Let $\tau^* \in \mathcal{Z}$ be a rule where $y_i < \bar{y} \Rightarrow \tau_{ji,t} > 0$, where $\bar{y}$ is average income.
Sustainable liberal redistribution

**Proposition**

Voluntary redistribution is sustainable in a liberal society in the presence of uncertainty when following the redistribution rule $\tau^*$, as long as transfers received are sufficiently large relative to transfers given.

- Potential resolution of indeterminacy in liberal society
- Partial basis for understanding philanthropic behavior
- Discrimination after occurrence of recognition
- Redistribution may not be appropriate response post recognition
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Taxation Rule

- Mechanical rule effecting tax if income rises above average

**Definition (Taxation rule)**

Let $\tau^* \in \mathcal{T}$ be a rule where $y_i > \bar{y}_i \Rightarrow \tau_{ij,t} > 0$, where $\bar{y}$ is average income.
Taxation Rule

- Mechanical rule effecting tax if income rises above average

Definition (Taxation rule)

Let $\tau^t \in \mathcal{T}$ be a rule where $y_i > \bar{y} \Rightarrow \tau_{ij,t} > 0$, where $\bar{y}$ is average income.
Endogenous illiberal recognition

Proposition

Voluntary recognition is sustainable in an authoritarian society in the presence of uncertainty when following the taxation rule $\tau^\dagger$.

- Even in completely illiberal society, recognition can arise endogenously
- Recognition occurs as a result of inability to resist temptation to tax
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Sparked off by accidental death of two teenagers in a working-class *banlieue* in eastern Paris

Unrest eventually spread to most urban areas and some rural areas in France

Nearly 2,900 rioters, mostly urban youth of North African origin, were arrested

*Liberté, égalité, fraternité* remain elusive for the unrecognized

Failure of recognition: Redistribution was secondary
Rwandan Genocide, 1994

- Catalyzed by assassination of (Hutu) President Juvénal Habyarimana
- Mass extermination of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in a 100-day period
- Belgian colonizers granted Tutsi minority preferential status, reversed in 1959
- Recognition with *selective* redistribution: Possible in an unfree society
First sign of violence between rival Muslim gang members, but escalated into religious conflict

Christian-Muslim clashes from January 1999 through February 2002

Exacerbated by economic conditions of the Asian financial crisis

Recognition without redistribution: Insufficiency in action
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Summary of Main Findings

- Clarified linkages between recognition, redistribution, and liberty
- Liberty is required for realization of recognition and redistribution
- Recognition is necessary but insufficient for redistribution
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Selected References

Proof of Proposition 1 (Sketch)

- Demonstrate the statement $\rho \subset \mathcal{R} \Rightarrow \sigma \in \mathcal{L}$
- Proof by contraction: Assume dictator who recognizes only one group
- Allow a group in society to recognize another by minimal liberalism
Proof of Proposition 2 (Sketch)

- **Necessity**: \( \forall \tau_{ij} \in \mathcal{T}, i \neq j : \{ \tau_{ij} \Rightarrow \rho_j \mid \exists j \in \rho \} \)
- **Sufficiency**: Failure by contradiction with minimal liberty assumption
Proof of Proposition 3 (Sketch)

- Proof for the case of a heterogeneous society (homogeneous case trivial)

- Lifetime welfare: \( W(\tau) = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \delta_{s-t} W_{i,s}(\tau_{ij,s}) \)

- Voluntary redistribution
  \( \Leftrightarrow W(\tau_{ij,t} > 0, \tau_{ji,T} > 0; \pi) \geq W(\tau = 0) \)

- Given sufficiently high \( \delta_i \) and \( \pi \), condition simplifies to
  \( W_{i,t}(\tau_{ij,t} > 0) \ll W_{i,t}(\tau_{ji,t} > 0) \)
Proof of Proposition 4 (Sketch)

- Proof for the case of a heterogeneous society (homogeneous case trivial)
- Dictator lifetime welfare: \( W(\tau) = E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \delta_{d}^{s-t} W_{d,s}(\tau_{dj,s}) \)
- Taxation (and recognition) \( \iff W(\tau_{jd,T} > 0; \mu) \geq W(\tau = 0) \)
- Condition simplifies to \( \mu \geq 0 \)